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One can only give an unbiased opinion about things that do not interest
one, which is no doubt the reason an unbiased opinion is always valueless.
The man who sees both sides of a question is a man who sees absolutely
nothing.
Oscar Wilde (1856-1900)
People frequently must make decisions without full information. Investors have to
decide whether to buy or sell a stock. Moviegoers have to decide whether to purchase
a ticket and see a movie. Legislators have to decide on how to vote on bills. CEO’s
have to make budgetary and personnel decisions. In all these cases, decision makers
do not themselves have the amount of information they would ideally like to have.
Consequently, they often obtain advice from experts who are better informed.
Experts are rarely indiﬀerent about the ﬁnal action taken by the decision maker.
Nor is it often the case that experts have exactly the same objectives as decision
makers. An investment advisor or analyst may have taken a long or short position on
the stock about which she makes recommendations.1 A movie critic may be harsh or
nice towards a genre of movies. A political advisor may have conservative or liberal
biases, or be beholden to special interests. Therefore, experts may have incentives
to distort information so as to induce decisions that are favorable to them. Decision
makers are aware that experts may be biased, and so must account for this when
making inferences from experts’ reports. Even when they have diﬀerent objectives,
experts and decision makers have a mutual interest in achieving communication in
many cases, since mistakes made by the decision maker are also potentially costly to
the expert.
Often, decision makers are uncertain about experts’ biases. Experts may make
conscious eﬀorts to hide their biases. Even when information about biases is available,
it may be diﬃcult to acquire. For example, even when an analyst does not actively
hide her conﬂict of interest in a stock, it may take a lot of eﬀort for an investor to
discover whether a conﬂict exists. A moviegoer may have to look through a number
of past reviews of movies he has seen to discover a movie critic’s bias towards a
particular genre of movies. The beneﬁts of obtaining such information may well be
overwhelmed by the costs.
1For pronoun consistency, the expert in this paper is referred to as “she” and the decision maker
“he.”
1Transparency is one of the key issues examined in this paper. When conﬂicts
of interest arise, does transparency about biases improve communication? Should
disclosure of such conﬂicts be mandated, or should those with conﬂicts of interest be
required to recuse themselves?
In this paper, I model a situation in which an expert provides advice to a deci-
sion maker. The decision maker is uncertain about the ﬁnal outcome of his action,
which depends on some underlying state. The expert does know the state, but her
preferences regarding the outcome are diﬀerent from those of the decision maker.
The expert’s bias is her private information.2 This model is an extension of the basic
cheap talk model studied by Crawford and Sobel (1982).
I fully characterize the equilibria of the game and prove two main results. First,
disclosure of biases never improves communication. That is, neither the expert nor
the decision maker prefers to have the bias of the expert disclosed.
When the expert is biased and her bias is common knowledge, the diﬃculty
in communication arises because the expert wants to make a report that favors her
interests. Knowing this, the decision maker must adjust his decisions appropriately.
If the expert makes a report that is too indicative of the underlying state, the decision
maker’s action is far from the expert’s favorite. The expert would then prefer to send
a report that induces some other action. This hinders eﬀective communication.
Now suppose that the expert could have either a positive bias or a negative bias,
and that the direction is unknown to the decision maker. Thus, the same report could
be sent in a lower state by the expert when she has a positive bias or in a higher state
by the expert when she has a negative bias. In equilibrium, the decision maker takes
an action that is adjusted from the report according to the expected misstatement,
reducing the tension between the expert and the decision maker, and rendering the
expert’s report more indicative of the underlying state. This beneﬁts the decision
maker, since it reduces the variance of the deviation of actions from the real states.
When disclosure policies force experts to reveal their biases, this eﬀect vanishes. This
is why disclosure does not achieve improvements in communication.
When the expert’s bias is known to the decision maker, since the decision maker
is rational, the expert cannot lead him to choose actions that systematically deviate
from the true state. She can only increase her utility by reducing the variance of the
deviation of the decision maker’s actions from the real states. However, her ability to
do so is restricted due to her bias. When the expert’s bias is not known to the decision
2I use the word “bias” and the phrase “conﬂict of interest” interchangeably to describe preference
misalignments between the decision maker and the expert.
2maker, on average, the expert still cannot make the decision maker choose actions that
systematically deviate from the true state. However, she can make overstatements
when she holds a positive bias, and make understatements when she holds a negative
bias. Therefore, the decision maker’s actions are closer to the expert’s most preferred
actions when biases are unknown to the decision maker. On the other hand, the
expert can also reduce the variance of the deviation of the decision maker’s actions
from the real states. Thus, her expected payoﬀ is higher when her bias is unknown
to the decision maker. The expert does not want her bias revealed.
Second, the more balanced the distribution of the expert’s bias, or the smaller
its size, the better oﬀ is the decision maker.
As the distribution of the bias becomes more balanced, or as the size of the bias
becomes smaller, the tension between the decision maker and the expert becomes
weaker. This makes eﬀective communication more likely between the expert and the
decision maker.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I provide examples
in which uncertainty about biases is a concern and review existing literature. In
Section 3, I develop a simple model of cheap talk with uncertainty about biases. In
Section 4, I fully characterize the equilibria of the cheap talk game. In Section 5, I
investigate how the decision maker’s payoﬀ depends on the distribution of biases, and
determine the eﬀect of mandatory disclosure policies. Finally, in Section 6, I inter-
pret the results, relate them to examples and the literature, and suggest directions
for further research. All proofs that are not in the main text are collected in the
Appendix.
2 Motivating Examples and Literature
In this section, I describe situations in which uncertainty about biases is a concern.I
also discuss the existing literature and compare the diﬀerences between it and my
work.
Examples. In professions that provide advice to customers and audiences, there
are many rules and regulations that deal with conﬂicts of interest. Take, for example,
business journalism. News organizations adopt two kinds of rules regarding conﬂicts
of interest. The ﬁrst kind requires that reporters avoid conﬂicts of interest altogether
or recuse themselves when such conﬂicts are present. The Wall Street Journal, CBS
Marketwatch, and TheStreet.com use rules of this type. The second type of rules
require only that such conﬂicts be fully disclosed. CNBC and Motley Fools have rules
3like this.3 Maria Bartiromo, the stock-market reporter and anchorwoman for CNBC,
recently caused controversy when she revealed that she was holding Citigroup stocks
before interviewing the company’s resigning CEO, Sanford I. Weill. Amy Zelvin,
a spokeswoman for CNBC, said that Ms. Bartiromo had abided by the network’s
policies, which require disclosure of stock ownership during on-air discussions about
companies that involve more than passing mention. On the other hand, Robert M.
Steele, senior faculty member and ethics group leader at the Poynter Institute, said,
“Disclosure doesn’t resolve a conﬂict of interest; all it does is reveal that a conﬂict
exists.”4 Do disclosure policies serve as remedy for presence of conﬂicts of interest?
Or should conﬂicts of interest be avoided altogether? This paper sheds some light on
the merits of each side of this debate.
While news organizations strive to avoid biases or to make their employees’ bi-
ases transparent, many lobbying organizations strive to hide theirs. They commonly
use misleading names or mission statements to conceal their true interests, and to
present themselves as educational, academic, and nonpartisan organizations.5 Water
Environment Federation, “although its name evokes images of cascading mountain
streams,” is the sewage industry’s main trade, lobby, and public relations organi-
zation.6 American Council on Science and Health is a group partially funded by
corporations like Anheuser-Busch, Giba-Geigy, Dow Chemical, etc. Its members fre-
quently publish articles and write op-ed pieces to refute charges of cancer risks from
chemicals and food additives.7 The general public is often misinformed about the real
interests of such organizations. An interesting question to ask in this case is: should
3It should be noted that when a news organization decides on these policies, it also has to take
into account the eﬀect they have on its hiring practices. Having stringent policies on conﬂicts of
interest may help enhance an organization’s image among its readers or audience, but it may also
negatively aﬀects the news organization’s ability to attract talented reporters, which indirectly hurts
its ability to provide higher quality reports.
4This example is taken from McGeehan (2003).
5News organizations and lobbying organizations are diﬀerent entities. The former attract au-
diences or readers at least partially through the informativeness of their news reports. They may
therefore optimally choose their bias to enhance credibility. On the other hand, lobbying organiza-
tions are intrinsically biased. It is then natural that they try to increase their inﬂuence by hiding
their biases.
6The quote comes from Stauber and Rampton (1995). Related information can be found at the
organization’s web site: http://www.wef.org/. The web site states the organization’s mission as
“preserving and enhancing the global water environment.”
7See Lutz (1996), Chapter 6, page 175. A search through Lexis-Nexis will turn up many op-ed
pieces and letters to the editor written by members of the organization, with a detectable common
theme.
4these organizations be required to disclose their interests in unequivocal language?
Should newspapers add a disclaimer about conﬂicts of interest whenever they publish
an article or letter written by a member of a special interest group?
Literature. The model presented in this paper is closely related to the model
of Morgan and Stocken (2003) and somewhat related to that of Morris (2001). The
former model incorporates a continuous state space, and assumes that the expert has
perfect information about the state, as the model in this paper does. The latter em-
ploys a discrete state space, and assumes that the expert has imperfect information
about the state. The similarity between their models and my own is that the deci-
sion maker is unsure of the expert’s bias, and that the expert behaves strategically
regardless of her bias. However, the bias distribution is skewed in one direction in
their models – there are “good” advisors who are unbiased and “bad” advisors who
have a non-zero bias in one direction. Thus, “bad” advisors always hurt “good” ad-
visors’ abilities to eﬀectively communicate to the decision maker. However, models
with a skewed bias distribution fail to capture the mitigating eﬀect of the existence
of opposite biases which is the focus of this paper.
From a purely theoretical point of view, this paper extends Crawford and Sobel
(1982) (CS henceforth) to study cheap talk when the the expert’s bias is uncertain.
Unlike Morgan and Stocken (2003), I allow uncertainty about the direction of the
expert’s bias. I also perform a comparative static analysis; this has not been done
for cheap talk models with uncertain biases. It is worth pointing out that this paper
beneﬁts signiﬁcantly from CS and Morgan and Stocken (2003) in its methods of proof.
B´ enabou and Laroque (1992) and Sobel (1985) also consider uncertainty about
expert types, and focus on experts’ reputation incentives. In their research, the
“good” advisors are nonstrategic and always tell the truth, while the “bad” advisors
are strategic and have incentives which directly conﬂict with those of the decision
maker. Their models are thus very diﬀerent from mine. There is also research that
focuses on uncertainty about another dimension – competence of experts or accu-
racy of experts’ information. Austen-Smith (1990), Ottaviani and Sørensen (2001),
and Moscarini (2003) make contributions in this direction.
Farrell and Gibbons (1989) study the eﬀects of the presence of diﬀerent audiences
on cheap talk, under a much diﬀerent setup based on a discrete state space. They ﬁnd
the eﬀect could be subversion, one-sided discipline, or mutual discipline.8 In contrast,
8Subversion refers to cases in which the speaker is able to communicate to one audience in private,
but the presence of another audience prevents him from such communication in public. One-Sided
Discipline means that the speaker cannot communicate to one audience in private, but the presence
of another audience enables him to eﬀectively communicate with this audience. Mutual discipline
5I study the eﬀect of the existence of diﬀerent types of speakers. The eﬀect that one
type of experts has on the other type is close in spirit to the “mutual discipline” eﬀect
in Farrell and Gibbons (1989).
3 The Model
An expert (E) gives advice to a decision maker (D). The decision maker makes a
decision that aﬀects both his own and the expert’s payoﬀs. Their payoﬀs also depend
on the value of an underlying state. The state s is a random variable uniformly
distributed on [0,1]. The realization of s is observable to the expert, but not to the
decision maker. The expert sends a costless message m from the message set M
after observing the true state. After receiving the message, the decision maker takes
action y ∈ R. The utility functions of the expert and the decision maker are denoted
UE(y,s,β) and UD(y,s), where β is the expert’s bias. They are deﬁned by
U
E(y,s,β) ≡ −(y − (s + β))
2,
U
D(y,s) ≡ −(y − s)
2.
In state s, the decision maker’s most preferred action is equal to s. If the expert has
bias β, her most preferred action is s + β. If β > 0, I say that the expert’s bias is
positive, while if β < 0, I say that the expert’s bias is negative.
This model is based on the leading example in CS. Now I introduce uncertainty
about biases to the model. The expert’s bias is her private information, and is drawn
from the following distribution:
β =
(
b with probability p,
−b with probability 1 − p.
I call the bias distribution “balanced” when p is close to 1
2. When p = 1
2, the expected
bias of the expert is zero. A smaller b, of course, corresponds to a smaller bias size.
I assume without loss of generality that p ∈ [1
2,1].
Let the message space M be [0,1]. This is not a real restriction since it is rich
enough for the expert to reveal all her private information. In particular, the expert
may report s/2 when her bias is −b, and (1 + s)/2 when her bias is b.
refers to cases in which the speaker is not able to communicate to either audience in private, but is
able to do so in public.
6Let the joint distribution function of the message and the state be F(s,m), then





(y(m) − (s + β0))
2 F(ds,dm),















If I combine messages that induce the same action into a single message, then the
mapping from states and biases ([0,1] × {b,−b}) to the decision maker’s actions
([0,1]) are not aﬀected. Neither is any player’s payoﬀ. In other words, this procedure
simply reduces essentially equivalent strategy proﬁles into a single strategy proﬁle,
without aﬀecting the number of distinct nonequivalent equilibria. From now on, I
treat messages that induce the same action as one message. I will use the phrase “the
message corresponding to action y” to refer to the message after receiving which the
decision maker takes action y.
I consider only pure strategies for the expert.9 A strategy for an expert with bias
β can then be characterized by the function µβ : [0,1] → [0,1]. Let P(s|m) be the
belief of the decision maker about the underlying state when he receives the message
m. Let y(m) be the action taken by the decision maker if he receives message m. Let
V D be the expected utility of the decision maker in a strategy proﬁle. I shall later
on add arguments and/or subscripts to V D to indicate its dependence on diﬀerent
parameters.
The solution concept I adopt here is Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium. This requires
that:
9In fact, this is without loss of generality, in terms of players’ expected payoﬀs. Because I have
reduced messages that induce the same action into one message, if an expert mixes between two
reports, it must be that the two reports induce actions between which the expert is indiﬀerent. Note
that the preferences of experts guarantee that there could be at most two such actions. Also, ties
between any two actions happen only in one state for an expert of any type. It is shown below
that all equilibria include only a ﬁnite number of actions, and the argument does not depend on
the exclusion of mixed strategies. Therefore, the points at which ties happen do not aﬀect expected
payoﬀs.
7E1. The decision maker’s beliefs, P(·|m), be formed using Bayes’ rule for any mes-
sage m whenever possible;10






E3. The expert’s messages, µβ(s), maximize her utility UE(y(m),s,β) for all s
among all m ∈ [0,1].
When describing equilibria in the rest of the paper, I omit the description of
beliefs. For messages that are not sent in equilibrium, the decision maker is allowed
to have any well deﬁned belief. In particular, he can interpret all these messages as if
they were one of the messages that are sent in equilibrium. This guarantees that the
expert’s incentive constraint E3 will not be violated by out-of-equilibrium messages.
As in all cheap talk models, with or without uncertainty about biases, there is
always a babbling equilibrium. In such an equilibrium, there is only one equilibrium
message and action. The expert sends this message regardless of the state she observes
or her own bias. The decision maker takes the action 1
2 no matter what message he
receives. No information is transmitted in this equilibrium. However, experts and
decision makers have a mutual interest in achieving some communication, unless their
preferences are too far apart.
I use the word “informative” to describe strategy proﬁles that give the decision
maker higher payoﬀs than his payoﬀ in the babbling equilibrium. A strategy pro-
ﬁle is “more informative” than another if the former gives the decision maker higher
expected utility. In cheap talk games, it is not unreasonable to expect to observe in-
formative equilibria when they exist. In fact, there is experimental evidence (Blume,
DeJong, Kim, and Sprinkle (1998)) to support this claim. A recent paper by Kar-
tik (2003) provides a justiﬁcation in the form of an equilibrium selection criterion.
Consequently, when making welfare comparisons, I focus on the most informative
equilibrium.
Two useful facts. I now derive two useful consequences of the agents’ quadratic
utility functions.
10To be precise, I need P(·|m) to be the regular conditional probability deﬁned by the joint
distribution of m and s. This more general deﬁnition is needed for cases when the joint distribution
function of m and s is neither continuous nor discrete. See Durrett (1996) for a discussion of regular
conditional probabilities.
8The ﬁrst fact describes how an agent’s ranking of two actions depends on the
underlying state.11
Lemma 1. For any two actions y and y0, y < y0, an agent of bias β prefers y to y0
if and only if s ≤
y+y0
2 − β.
Proof. The state s =
y+y0
2 − β is at the midpoint of the interval [y − β,y0 − β]. Thus
UE(y,s,β) = UE(y0,s,β) at s =
y+y0
2 − β. For any state s ≤
y+y0
2 − β, the expert’s
most preferred action is closer to y than y0. Lemma 1 thus follows.
Lemma 1 implies that the states in which an expert (weakly) prefers an action y
to all other actions must form a closed interval when such states exist. This is because
arbitrary intersections of closed intervals remain closed intervals when nonempty.
The second fact is a characterization of the decision maker’s optimal action when
receiving any message.
Lemma 2. The decision maker’s optimal action given any message m in equilibrium
is equal to the conditional expectation E(s|m).
Proof. This Lemma can be proved by standard procedures. Any other decision rule
˜ y(m) can be shown to add to the expected squared distance, and to reduce expected
utility of the decision maker. That is,
E(U
D(˜ y(m),s)|m) = −E((E(s|m) − s)




Lemma 2 says that the decision maker simply takes the action that is equal to
the expected value of the underlying state. In doing this, he has taken into account
possible misrepresentation by the expert due to her bias.
Note that both of these facts are true regardless of the state distribution.
Before proceeding to the characterization of equilibrium, I describe what happens
if the expert is required to fully disclose her bias. Later I will compare the decision
maker’s payoﬀ in this case with his payoﬀ when the decision maker is uncertain about
the expert’s biases.
11In general, Lemma 1 is true as long as the expert’s preferences are strictly concave in y, UE
12 > 0,
UE
13 > 0 and satisfy a symmetry condition: UD(y,s,β) = UD(y0,s0,β0) whenever |y − (s + β)| =
|y0 − (s0 + β0)|.
9Full Disclosure of Biases. When the decision maker learns that the expert’s
bias is b, the game is identical to that in CS. CS fully characterizes the equilibria
when the expert’s bias is common knowledge. The set of equilibria is characterized
by a partition of the interval [0,1] with the boundary points {αi}n
i=0 satisfying
α0 = 0
αi+1 − αi = αi − αi−1 + 4b for i = 1,2,...,n − 1 (1)
αn = 1,
for each n ∈ {1,2,...,N(b)}. I call n the partition size, which measures the number















(where dze denotes the smallest integer larger than or equal to z). It is the largest
integer n that satisﬁes
2n(n − 1)b < 1.
In each interval (αi−1,αi) the message mi is sent by the expert. When receiving the





which is consistent with Lemma 2. At each boundary point αi (i = 1,...,n − 1), the





This is how (1) is obtained. For each n, the boundary points are uniquely determined.
There exists a bijective relation between equilibria with bias b and equilibria with
bias −b which maps an equilibrium into its exact mirror image with respect to the
point 1
2. In particular, if {αi}
n
i=0 are the boundary points for a partition equilibrium
of size n with bias b, then I may deﬁne
α
0




i=0 will be a partition equilibrium of size n with bias −b. This equilibrium
gives the decision maker exactly the same expected payoﬀ as the equilibrium with
boundary points {αi}
n
i=0 and bias b. Furthermore, the only possible equilibria with
10bias −b are those that can be expressed in the above form as mirror images of equilibria
with bias b. Therefore, in the most informative equilibrium with bias b and in that
with bias −b, the expected utility of the decision maker is the same. In my model
with uncertainty about biases, the bias could be either b or −b. Therefore, when the
bias of the expert is fully disclosed, the decision maker’s highest utility is the same
as his highest utility when p = 1.
It is worth noting that when biases are common knowledge, no information is
transmitted when b ≥ 1
4. That is, N(b) = 1 for b ≥ 1
4. I will later compare this
threshold with the threshold in the case where biases are unknown to the decision
maker.
i α + b i y i i − 1 α i i + 1 α i α i yi + 1
. . . . . . .
i
Figure 1: Part of A Partitional Equilibrium in CS
From the description of the equilibrium above, observe that if the expert has
positive bias b, the lengths of partition elements are the smallest at the left end of
the interval [0,1]; these lengths grow as we move to the right.12 Figure 1 illustrates
the reason for this phenomenon. At the boundary point αi, the expert is indiﬀerent
between actions yi and yi+1. But if her bias is b, her most preferred action is actually
αi + b. Since yi =
αi+αi−1
2 and yi+1 =
αi+αi+1
2 , αi+1 must be shifted to the right
from αi more than the shift from αi−1 to αi. This is what makes the intervals longer
and communication coarser as we move along the direction of the bias. At the same
time, this limits the number of messages that can be sent by the expert in equilibrium.
Thus, ineﬃciency of information transmission occurs mainly at the end of the interval
matching the direction of the expert’s bias.
Let me use the metaphor of movie reviewing to illustrate this point. If a critic has
a penchant for science ﬁction movies and her bias is known to the public, then her ac-
claim of “The Matrix” conveys less information than her dismissal of “Armageddon.”
Furthermore, since she gives the same rating to movies with varied quality levels at
the high quality end, the number of possible ratings she could give to movies is also
limited. Her ability to inﬂuence movie audiences’ choices of science ﬁction movies is
hurt by her bias.
This immediately brings up a possibility: when the expert can have either pos-
itive biases or negative biases, can the uneven lengths of the partition units be “av-
12The opposite is true if the expert has negative bias −b.
11eraged out”? In this process, can the number of partition units be increased? Can
better communication be achieved? The following two sections explore these ques-
tions.
4 Equilibria with Uncertain Biases
First I identify a necessary condition for communication to be informative in equilib-
rium.
Lemma 3. There is no more than one action in equilibrium if b ≥ 1
2.
Proof. Suppose there are at least two actions in equilibrium. Since y(m) = E(s|m), I
have E(y(m)) = E(E(s|m)) = E(s) = 1
2. Let y,y0 be the maximum and minimum of
actions taken in equilibrium respectively.13 It must be the case that y < 1
2 < y0. The
action y0 is the most preferred action by an expert of bias b if s ≥ max{y0 −b,0}. On
the other hand, using Lemma 1, the message corresponding to action y0 could only
be sent by an expert of bias −b if
y + y0
2
+ b < 1.
If this condition does not hold, then
y
0 ≤





2 if y0 ≤ b;
y0
2 + 1−b
2 if y0 > b.
The inequality sign is because there may exist s ≤ y0−b in which an expert with bias
b sends the message corresponding to y0. In either case of the above equation, there
is a contradiction since b ≥ 1
2 and y0 > 1
2. If the condition
y+y0
2 + b < 1 does hold,




− b < 0.
Thus by Lemma 1, the message corresponding to y is never sent by an expert of bias
b. A contradiction similar to the one for y0 above can be derived for y. So we can
never have more than one action in equilibrium.
This Lemma is a negative result regarding extremist experts: when experts’
biases are large in magnitude, babbling becomes the unique equilibrium. Intuitively,
13When the maximum and/or the minimum do not exist, I can use the supremum and/or inﬁmum
instead. Limiting arguments can be used to reach the same conclusion by the same reasoning. This
applies to below proofs as well.
12since biases are large, whenever there are two actions on opposite sides of 1
2, at least
one type of experts strictly prefers one action y to the other action y0 in all states.
Thus, the message corresponding to y0 is only sent by the other type. However, biases
are so large that after correction, the decision maker would not want to take action
y0 when receiving the corresponding message. This generates a contradiction.
This result can be contrasted with results from models in which experts are
either unbiased or have positive bias b. In those models, even when b is large, the
unbiased expert can still reveal the value of the state, as long as the realized state
is below a threshold (see Proposition 2, Morgan and Stocken (2003)). Furthermore,
this threshold is independent of b as long as b is large enough, and converges to 1 as
the probability of the expert’s being biased converges to zero. Thus the existence of
extremist experts does not hurt communication much, as long as they are relatively
rare. This is true because an expert with a large positive bias does not want to
send a message that induces a relatively low action. Thus, an unbiased expert can
reveal low states. However, the above Lemma shows that if there are only extremists
with positive biases and extremists with negative biases, then large biases preclude
communication.
On the other hand, the threshold, 1
2, is larger than that in the full disclosure
case, 1
4. In fact, as long as b < 1
2, informative equilibria do exist for all p ∈ [1
2,1).
So indeed, allowing uncertainty about biases expands the set of bias sizes for which
informative communication is possible. Now I consider the special case p = 1
2 to
demonstrate this fact, and reserve the discussion.14
Lemma 4. When b < 1
2 and p = 1
2, the following strategy proﬁle constitutes an
equilibrium:





b if β = −b, and s ∈ [0,2b];
s + β if s ∈ [b − β,1 − b − β];
1 − b if β = b, and s ∈ [1 − 2b,1].
2. Upon receiving message m, the decision maker takes action y(m) = m for all
m ∈ [b,1 − b]. For any other message, y(m) can be any action in [b,1 − b].
When p = 1
2, the distribution of biases is balanced. For any action y in the
interval (b,1 − b), the positive-biased expert sends the corresponding message when
14The equilibrium construction for p = 1
2 also appears in de Garidel-Thoron and Ottaviani (2000).
13s = y − b, and the negative-biased expert sends it when s = y + b. It is optimal for
the decision maker to take action y when he receives this message, as the expected
misstatement is zero due to the balanced distribution. As a result, when reports in the
open interval (b,1−b) are sent, any small variation in the underlying state is reﬂected
in the expert’s report. Although these reports correspond to actions diﬀerent from
the true state, the variance of the distance is small.
Let me return to the movie critic metaphor. If there are some critics who dislike
science ﬁction movies and other critics who like them, and if their biases are unknown
to moviegoers, then the former will provide much information when the movie is of
high or medium quality, and the latter will provide much information when the movie
is of bad or medium quality. On the other hand, communication is coarse at the two
ends in the direction of the expert’s bias. Thus, the existence of opposite opinions
makes sure that the expert only resorts to uninformative rhetoric when the state is
near the extreme in the direction of her biases. Similar eﬀects exist for all other
p ∈ (1
2,1), as will be shown in the general discussion that follows.
In fact, the equilibrium constructed above is the most informative equilibrium
for p = 1
2 in any mechanism without monetary transfers. It has been shown that
for quadratic preferences and uniform state distribution, in the most informative
equilibrium of all possible mechanisms, the decision maker would commit to choosing
actions in the interval [b,1 − b] when it is common knowledge that the expert’s bias
is b. The mapping from states to actions is exactly the same as that deﬁned by
Lemma 4. Thus his optimal expected payoﬀ is the same as in Lemma 4, conditional
on the expert’s bias being b.15 The same is true when it is common knowledge that
the bias of the expert is −b. From the view of mechanism design, the optimal outcome
in which the decision maker knows the expert’s bias is necessarily at least as good
as the optimal outcome in which the decision maker does not. The reason is that
in the former, the decision maker can choose diﬀerent incentive schemes for diﬀerent
biases of the expert, but in the latter, he must choose the same incentive scheme for
the expert no matter what her bias is. Since the decision maker achieves the same
payoﬀ in Lemma 4 as in the case where he does know the expert’s bias, his payoﬀ in
Lemma 4 must be the highest in the case where he does not know the expert’s bias.
It is straightforward to show that the decision maker’s expected utility in this
15I thank Timofey Mylovanov for pointing this out to me. The argument that this is the best
outcome can be found in his paper, Mylovanov (2003).
14equilibrium is
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Later on, I compare this expression with payoﬀs from other equilibria and models.
Due to Lemma 3, there exist informative equilibria only if b < 1
2. So I consider
only b ∈ (0, 1
2) throughout the rest of the paper. First, I establish a result describing
the expert’s behavior in equilibrium. It is assumed in Morgan and Stocken (2003)
when they discuss partitional equilibria, but it is an implication of the model here.
Lemma 5. In any informative equilibrium of the game, there is no message that is
sent by only one type of expert. In other words, the decision maker can never infer
with certainty the expert’s bias from her reports.
Proof. First, any message corresponding to y ∈ [b,1 − b] cannot be sent by only one
type of expert. The reason is that an expert of bias β ﬁnds the action y strictly better
than all other actions at state s = y − β.
Second, there cannot be messages corresponding to actions in [0,b) ∪ (1 − b,1]
that are sent by only one type of expert. I consider y ∈ [0,b) only, since the case
y ∈ (1 − b,1] is similar. Let y0 be the smallest such action and y00 be the largest.
I claim that y0 = y00, which means there can be at most one action in [0,b)
satisfying the above requirement. If y00 > y0 instead, then message y0 is never sent
by a type b expert since y00 is strictly preferred. However a type −b expert strictly
prefers y0 to any other action when s ∈ [0,y0 + b]; thus, y0 ≥
y0+b
2 , contradicting the
assumption that y0 ∈ [0,b).
Since the equilibrium is informative, let ˆ y be the smallest action in equilibrium
that is greater than y0. Now, by Lemma 1, a type −b expert strictly prefers y0 to all
other actions when s <
y0+ˆ y
2 + b. By our assumption, the message corresponding to
















This is impossible since it is assumed that y0 < ˆ y and y0 < b.
15Now I show a result similar to Lemma 1 in CS.
Lemma 6. If p ∈ (1/2,1], there is no equilibrium in which an inﬁnite number of
possible actions are taken .
The intuition behind the above lemma is as follows. If actions are arbitrarily
close to one another in equilibrium, the expert sends the message that induces action
y if and only if s is arbitrarily close to y − b when she has positive bias, and if and
only if s is arbitrarily close to y+b when she has negative bias. However, the decision
maker bases his action upon the expected value of the underlying state. Since p 6= 1
2,
the distorting eﬀects of the two types cannot exactly cancel each other. Thus, the
expected value is diﬀerent from y, which causes a contradiction. Hence, the fact p 6= 1
2
precludes the possibility of an inﬁnite number of actions. In fact, when p = 1
2, there
does exist an equilibrium in which there are inﬁnitely many actions in equilibrium,
as shown in Lemma 4.16
Lemma 6 establishes that there are only a ﬁnite number of actions in equilibrium
if p > 1
2 and b > 0. In particular, this means that there do not exist fully revealing
equilibria or semi-revealing equilibria, in the latter of which an expert’s induced action
is strictly increasing in the underlying state for some interval of states. There can
only be partitional equilibria in this game.
I list the equilibrium actions in ascending order: {y1,...,yn}, and label the mes-




i = 1,...,n − 1.
This is the average of adjacent actions. It is useful for deﬁning the boundary points
















i ] for bias β. For any n,
each type partitions the interval [0,1] into n elements, and sends the message mi only
in the i-th element. The decision maker forms Bayesian beliefs about the underlying
state, and takes the action that is equal to the conditional expected value of the state.
16If I generalize the model to allow the positive bias and the negative bias to be of diﬀerent
magnitudes, then what matters in the proof is that the expected value of the bias is nonzero.
16Such an equilibrium requires that a1 ≥ b and an−1 ≤ 1 − b.17 The following theorem
fully characterizes all the equilibria of the game (except the one speciﬁed in Lemma 4,
which can be obtained as the limit of partitional equilibria as n goes to inﬁnity).18
Theorem 1. Suppose p ∈ [1
2,1] and b ∈ (0, 1
2). For p ∈ (1
2,1], there exists some
positive integer N(p,b) such that each n = 1,2,...,N(p,b) corresponds to exactly one
partitional equilibrium, and these are the only equilibria. When p = 1
2, a partitional
equilibrium exists for each n ∈ N.
1. The equilibrium of partition size n can be characterized by:




i ), where a
β
i is deﬁned by (2).
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In the above equation,
δ(a,p,b) ≡
a2 − b2
a + (1 − 2p)b
≡ a − b ·
(1 − 2p)a + b
a + (1 − 2p)b
.
2. For p 6= 1, the number N(p,b) is the largest integer n satisfying
(b − 2b(n − 2)2(1 − 2p) − 1)2 − b2
b − 2b(n − 2)2(1 − 2p) − 1 + b(1 − 2p)
− 4b(n − 2)(1 − 2p) ≤ 0, (4)
among all n that satisfy
b − 2b(n − 2)
2(1 − 2p) < 1 − b.
For p = 1, the number N(1,b) is the largest integer satisfying
2n(n − 1)b ≤ 1.
17Lemma 11 in the Appendix shows that the former implies the latter when p ≥ 1
2.
18This Theorem is very similar to Proposition 3 in Morgan and Stocken (2003). However, there
are two diﬀerences. First, the statement of my result does not need the qualiﬁcation “suppose the
decision maker cannot infer the expert’s bias,” which is a consequence of Lemma 5. Second, I show
(in Lemma 6) that there cannot be any non-partitional equilibrium for p 6= 1
2. These observations
highlight the diﬀerences between models with a two-sided bias distribution and those with a one-
sided distribution.
17Theorem 1 conﬁrms that in this model, the communication equilibrium is of
partitional form as identiﬁed in CS. A positive-biased expert has boundary points
that are exactly 2b less than those of a negative-biased expert. Equation (3) reﬂects
the fact that the action taken by the decision maker after receiving any message
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Figure 2: The size-3 equilibrium when b = 1
6 and p = 2
3
partition size 3 for p = 2
3 and b = 1
6.19 In this equilibrium a1 = 0.24 and a2 = 0.51.
The boundary points for an expert with bias β is a
β
i deﬁned in (2).
Adding up adjacent equations in (3), I obtain
a2 − a1 = δ(a1,p,b) − 2b(1 − 2p)
ai − ai−1 = ai−1 − ai−2 − 4b(1 − 2p) i = 3,...,n − 1,(5)
−δ(an−1 − 1,p,b) + 2b(1 − 2p) = an−1 − an−2
The condition to determine N(p,b) is obtained by setting a1 = b. I need to
ensure that an−1 does not become too large. Suppose I consider only the ﬁrst n − 2
equations in (5). As shown in the proof of the Theorem, ﬁxing all parameters, if
the initial value a1 increases, all boundary points will be shifted to the right, and
each step ai − ai−1 becomes larger. However, in order for {ai}
n
i=0 to be part of an
equilibrium, an−1 and an−2 have to satisfy the last equation in (5). The left hand side
is decreasing in an−1 and hence decreasing in a1, but the right hand side is increasing
in a1. Therefore, in order for there to exist an a1 to generate boundary points that
satisfy (5), the left hand side of the last equation must be greater than or equal to
the right hand side when a1 = b.




1 should be the same. Due to
rounding, the numbers in Figure 2 do not exactly satisfy this.




∂p < 0 for i = 1,...,n − 1 at all p ∈ [1
2,1].
The above corollary implies that all boundary points are shifted to the right as
p decreases to 1
2 from 1. Recall that when p is equal to one, the partition at the
left end is extremely short and the partition at the right end is extremely long. One
can roughly interpret this result as follows: partition elements become more even in
length on average as p approaches 1
2.20 The meaning of this statement is made precise
in Lemma 7 of Section 5.
Corollary 1.2. The maximum partition size N(p,b) is nonincreasing in p and non-
increasing in b.
This means that the closer p is to 1
2, the more partitional equilibria that exist.
On the other hand, the smaller the size of the bias, the more partitional equilibria
that exist. The latter statement generalizes a comparative static result of CS to the
incomplete information setting. Now I look at two special cases.
Example 1. If n is ﬁxed, as p approaches 1
2 the left hand side of (4) converges to
(b−1)2−b2
b−1 . Since b ∈ (0, 1
2), this expression is always negative. If I ﬁx any n ∈ N, (4)
is satisﬁed for p close enough 1
2. Thus N(p,b) goes to inﬁnity as p approaches 1
2.
Also the initial point a1 corresponding to the partition size N(p,b) converges to b as
p goes to 1
2, since a1 is continuous in n and p. Also, for the equilibrium of partition
size N(p,b), each step ai − ai−1 goes to zero, and an−1 converges to 1 − b. So the
equilibrium with the most partition elements converges to that speciﬁed in Lemma 4.
Example 2. I now investigate the existence of informative equilibria. Such
equilibria exist whenever (4) is satisﬁed when the number of messages n equals 2.
The condition also reduces to
(b−1)2−b2
b−1 ≤ 0, which is true for all b ∈ (0, 1
2). Observe
that there is a discontinuity in the existence of informative equilibria at the point
p = 1. When p = 1, there are no informative equilibria for b ≥ 1
4. However, for all
p < 1, there exist informative equilibria for all b < 1
2.
20Of course, boundary points continues to shift to the right as p decreases below 1
2. But now the
lengths of partition elements become more uneven on average as p becomes smaller.
195 Welfare
I now study how the expected utility of the decision maker, V D, depends on b and p
in equilibrium. In a equilibrium of partition size n,
V
D
















First, I perform the comparative static analysis for p. The following lemma states
that for any ﬁxed partition size n, a lower p always gives the decision maker a higher
expected utility.
Lemma 7. For any ﬁxed b ∈ (0, 1
2) and partition size n, V D
n (p,b) is strictly decreasing
in p for all p ∈ (1
2,1].
This Lemma says that the decision maker always strictly prefers an equilibrium
in which p is smaller, given any partition size n. A decrease in p has two eﬀects on
the expected utility of the decision maker. First, it decreases the weight placed on
the expected utility from consulting the positive-biased type. The decision maker’s
expected utility from consulting the positive-biased type is lower than that from con-
sulting the negative-biased type. Thus, the ﬁrst eﬀect increases the decision maker’s
expected utility. The second eﬀect of a decrease in p is that all boundary points
are shifted to the right. This decreases the decision maker’s expected utility from
consulting the negative-biased type but increases that from consulting the positive-
biased type by the same amount. The latter carries more weight since p ≥ 1
2. Thus,
the second eﬀect also serves to increase the decision maker’s overall expected utility.
It should be noted that shifts in boundary points also lead to shifts in the decision
maker’s actions. But these actions are chosen by the decision maker to maximize his
expected utility. The envelope theorem tells us that the marginal eﬀect of such shifts
on the decision maker’s expected utility is zero. In conclusion, when the partition
size n is ﬁxed, decreasing p has the marginal eﬀect of increasing the decision maker’s
expected utility.
Let V D
∗ (p,b) denote the decision maker’s expected payoﬀ in the most informative
equilibrium of the game with prior p ∈ [1
2,1] and bias size b ∈ (0, 1
2). Corollary 1.2
and Lemma 7 together imply the following result.
Theorem 2. In the cheap talk game with uncertain biases, V D
∗ (p,b) is strictly de-
creasing in p. In other words, the decision maker’s equilibrium utility is increasing in
the symmetry of the bias distribution.
20Theorem 2 states that the more balanced the bias distribution, the more success-
ful the information transmission from the expert to the decision maker. For intuition,
ﬁrst note that for any ﬁxed partition size, Lemma 7 implies that an equilibrium with
a more balanced distribution makes the decision maker better oﬀ through the two
eﬀects described above. Furthermore, with a more balanced distribution, the ex-
pected conﬂict of interest between the decision maker and the expert is weaker. By
Corollary 1.2, this generates equilibria based on partitions with a larger number of
elements. Thus, there are a larger set of equilibria from which to choose the most in-
formative equilibrium. The decision maker’s expected payoﬀ in the most informative
equilibrium becomes higher. In fact, by Lemma 8 below, an equilibrium with a larger
partition size is necessarily more informative.
Lemma 8. For any b ∈ (0, 1
2), the decision maker always prefers an equilibrium with
a larger partition size.
This Lemma simply conﬁrms the intuition that a larger number of partition
elements makes communication more informative, and so beneﬁts the decision maker.
The proof of this Lemma is reminiscent of CS’s proof of the analogous result under
common knowledge of biases. The argument by CS is that an equilibrium with
n partition elements can be obtained by deformation of an equilibrium with n +
1 partition elements. During the deformation process, the decision maker’s payoﬀ
continues to decrease. The process here is slightly diﬀerent. The equilibrium with
n partition elements cannot be obtained exactly by deforming the equilibrium of
partition size n + 1. Instead, I obtain a reﬁnement of the size-n equilibrium through
deformation.21 A reﬁnement of a partition is necessarily more informative than the
original partition.22 At the same time, the deformation process is payoﬀ-decreasing.
So the size-n + 1 equilibrium is more informative than the size-n equilibrium.
From Lemma 8, I conclude that the most informative equilibrium for any p and
b is always the one with N(p,b) partition elements. That is,
V
D
∗ (p,b) = V
D
N(p,b)(p,b).
Thus for any b ∈ (0, 1
2), the equilibrium in Lemma 4 for the case p = 1
2 gives the
decision maker the highest payoﬀ among all possible equilibria for all p ∈ [0,1].
21A partition A is a reﬁnement of a partition A0 if every partition element of A0 is a disjoint union
of partition elements of A. In this model, an alternative deﬁnition is that the boundary points of A0
are a subset of those of A.
22One may appeal to the argument for Lemma 2 to prove this statement.
21Furthermore, as p approaches 1
2, since N(p,b) goes to inﬁnity, the most informative
equilibrium approaches the equilibrium in Lemma 4.
The following Theorem is a direct implication of Theorem 2.
Theorem 3. In the cheap talk game with uncertain biases, full disclosure of biases
never beneﬁts the decision maker.
Proof. Note that in Section 3, I have shown that the most informative equilibrium in
the case of full disclosure gives the decision maker the same payoﬀ as that in the most
informative equilibrium with p = 1. By Theorem 2, for any p, the decision maker’s
payoﬀ in the most informative equilibrium without disclosure is always higher than
the payoﬀ under full disclosure.
Theorem 3 is a result regarding transparency. Based on the analysis of the
stylized model, I draw the rather counterintuitive conclusion that transparency about
biases does not improve communication. Thus, policy makers should use caution when
considering policies meant to increase transparency.
I now discuss the intuition for this result. For simplicity, I use ﬁve categories
to characterize the state, the decision, and the report. They could be “extremely
low,” “moderately low,” “average,” “moderately high,” or “extremely high.”23 Each
happens with equal probability. Also, assume a positive-biased expert would like
the action to be one notch above the true state, and vice versa for a negative-biased
expert. Assume also that the expert’s utility is symmetric around her most preferred
action.24
The expert is either of positive or negative bias. When the decision maker ﬁnds
out what her bias is, the factors that hinder eﬀective communication between the
expert and the decision maker exist in full force. Take, for example, a positive-biased
expert. At the state “moderately low,” she is indiﬀerent between actions “extremely
low” and “extremely high.” She cannot credibly distinguish between any of the three
highest states with the other two. All these three states are thus pooled together into
one message. But given the decision maker takes an action based on the expected
state, the expert would also want to pool “moderately low” with the high message.
The only equilibrium then involves the expert pooling the four highest states together
23I also allow two actions called “excessively low” and “excessively high.” The former is the
most preferred action by a negative-biased expert in state “extremely low.” The latter is analogous.
However, these are never taken by the decision maker in equilibrium.
24The example I consider here has a discrete space. However, the intuition discussed here is the
same as that in my model with a continuous state space.
22and reporting the “extremely low” state as a separate message. Much information is
lost here.
However, when there is uncertainty about the expert’s bias, the decision maker
can reason as follows. When the decision maker receives a moderately high message,
it could be because the state is extremely high, and the expert has negative bias, or
because the state is average, and the expert has positive bias. This kind of reasoning
works for the middle three “moderate” messages.25 Thus he would take the action
that “matches” the meaning of the messages by taking the expected value of the state
conditional on the message received. Given this reasoning by the decision maker, the
expert ﬁnds it optimal to report such messages, since the action taken by the decision
maker is close to her most preferred action for the bias-state combinations. This eﬀect
enables the expert and the decision maker to achieve better communication.
Now, I determine the comparative statics of welfare with respect to changes in
b. First, I show that for any ﬁxed partition size n, a lower b always gives the decision
maker higher expected utility.
Lemma 9. For any ﬁxed p and partition size n, V D
n (p,b) is strictly decreasing in b.
Lemma 9 says that the decision maker always strictly prefers an equilibrium in
which b is smaller. The next result follows immediately from Corollary 1.2 and this
Lemma.
Theorem 4. In the cheap talk game with uncertain biases, V D
∗ (p,b) is strictly de-
creasing in b.
This Theorem states that a smaller bias size beneﬁts the decision maker. It
conﬁrms the analogous result in CS. The proof of Lemma 9 is an extension of the
proof used in CS.
Let us now look at the problem from a diﬀerent perspective. Suppose there is
a population of experts. Each expert has a chance of being randomly selected to be
consulted by the decision maker. I ask the question: which type of expert is made
better oﬀ when the distribution is more balanced? I state the following result in a
more general fashion than previous results. This theorem is true as long as both the
decision maker and the expert have quadratic preferences as deﬁned in Section 3. In
particular, the result does not depend on the bias distribution or the state distribution.
25On the other hand, the expert still cannot separate “moderately high” and “extremely high”
when she is of positive bias.
23Theorem 5. Consider any two equilibria Γ and ˆ Γ of a cheap talk game with uncertain
biases. The corresponding expected utilities are V D and ˆ V D for the decision maker,
and V β0 and ˆ V β0 for an expert with bias β0 respectively. Then
V
D ≥ ˆ V
D ⇔ V
β0 ≥ ˆ V
β0.
Proof. Note each equilibrium strategy proﬁle generates a joint distribution of s and
m on [0,1] × R. Then
V
β0 = −E(s − E(s|m) − β0)
2
= −E((s − E(s|m))











Thus V β0 diﬀers from V D only by a constant. Hence the desired statement.
This Theorem implies that an expert’s ranking of diﬀerent equilibria is exactly
the same as the decision maker’s regardless of her bias. Thus, in my model, both
types of experts prefer to have a more balanced distribution of biases.
Theorem 5 also implies that the expert prefers hiding her bias to disclosing it.
The argument goes as follows. By revealed preferences, in each equilibrium, the
expert is better oﬀ when an expert of the same type is consulted than if an expert
of the other type is consulted, since the set of actions to choose from is the same
in the two scenarios. Observe that her expected payoﬀ prior to learning which type
is to be consulted is a convex combination of her expected payoﬀ from herself being
consulted, and that from the other type being consulted. Therefore, her expected
payoﬀ from being consulted is higher than the expected payoﬀ evaluated prior to
learning which type of expert will be consulted. By Theorems 3 and 5, the latter
payoﬀ is higher than her expected payoﬀ when the expert’s bias is disclosed. Hence,
the expert prefers not to have her bias disclosed if she knows she is the one who will
be consulted.
6 Discussions
6.1 What Are the Lessons Learned?
In this paper, I consider a simple model of cheap talk in which the direction of the
expert’s bias is uncertain. I ﬁnd that in this scenario, it is never beneﬁcial to the
24decision maker or the expert to have the bias of the expert disclosed. The decision
maker also beneﬁts when the expert’s bias has a more balanced distribution or a
smaller size.
I now use these results to reconsider the examples in Section 2. A business jour-
nalist may have an interest in seeing the stock she covers to fall or rise. The former
could be because she has taken a short position or because she wants to purchase
the stock in the near future. The latter could be caused by the opposite.26 Further
suppose that the news organization mandates a policy of full disclosure. My result
indicates that it is possible that such disclosure policy could actually hurt the organi-
zation’s ability to convey information to its viewers, and reduce the informativeness
of its reporting. Robert M. Steele’s comment that disclosure does not resolve con-
ﬂicts is quite relevant. The reason is that if a business journalist’s conﬂict of interest
is disclosed, her propensity to misstate and the direction of her misstatements will
be common knowledge. Diﬃculties in communication arise, as demonstrated in Sec-
tion 3. However, if uncertainty about conﬂicts remains, the distrust of the reporter
by the viewers is likely to be mitigated. Therefore, full disclosure policies should not
be viewed as a remedy measure lying somewhere “between” (1) avoiding conﬂicts of
interest, and (2) allowing conﬂicts of interest and no disclosure.
Why might one expect transparency of biases to be good for communication? My
opinion is that such intuition relies heavily on the assumption that decision makers
may be naive, and therefore may be deceived and misled. Since all players are rational
in my model, this possibility is precluded. The assessment of the relevance of this
intuition depends on one’s view of the decision maker’s rational reasoning ability.27
One can draw similar conclusions regarding lobby organizations. Forcing them to
disclose their true interests may not be beneﬁcial for communication, if there are other
organizations with opposing views. Theorem 5 implies that it is in lobbyists’ best
interests to hide their biases. There is also another important policy implication.
When the debate on an issue is dominated by one side, a policy maker may want
to provide support to the other side, so as to improve the public’s information on
the issue. For example, if industrial manufacturers fund many organizations that
advocate looser product safety regulations and lower liabilities, then the government
26One must keep in mind that reputation incentives ` a la B´ enabou and Laroque (1992) also exist
in reality. In this paper, all players are strategic.
27See Crawford (2003) and Ottaviani and Squintani (2002) for interesting discussions about what
happens when receivers of messages may be naive. As a reader of Dilbert, I must admit that I do
not ﬁnd implausible the assumption that decision makers could lack reasoning ability.
25may ﬁnd it beneﬁcial to support organizations that are in favor of the opposite.28
At the risk of overreaching and self-promotion, I argue that this model may also
imply that academic social scientists can educate the public about issues better than
political pundits. The public is uncertain about the former’s biases, while the latter’s
biases are well publicized. Consistently with what the model predicts, the former tend
to use in-depth analysis and comprehensive presentation of facts, while the latter tend
to resort more often to sensationalistic and uninformative rhetoric.
6.2 Multiple Experts?
In this subsection, I relate the results of this paper to those of Krishna and Morgan
(2001). They show that if a decision maker sequentially consults two experts of
opposite biases b1 < 0 < b2, then regardless of the size of b1, there exists a semi-
revealing equilibrium. In this equilibrium, the experts reveal the value of the state
when the realization of s lies in [0,1 − 2b2], and pool the other states together. Of
course, the decision maker could also switch the order of consultation, and get all
information in [−2b1,1] revealed. Thus, the decision maker can choose to ask the less
biased expert last, and obtain the most informative equilibrium.
It is straightforward to see that the equilibrium in Lemma 4 for the case p = 1
2
can be generalized to the case in which |b1| 6= |b2| and pb1 + (1 − p)b2 = 0, as long as
max{|b1|,|b2|} < 1
2. This equilibrium is worse for the decision maker than the Krishna
and Morgan (2001) (KM henceforth) equilibrium described in the previous paragraph.
First, for each bias value, what happens at the two ends of the interval (the “pooling”
states) is similar to that in KM. But the decision maker’s payoﬀ in my model is
aﬀected by the size of both biases, while in KM it is only aﬀected by the smaller bias.
Furthermore, for states in which the expert’s report is strictly increasing in the state
(the “revealing” states), the decision maker’s action is always |bi| away from the true
state when he asks an expert of type i.
On the other hand, KM also ﬁnd that sequential consultation of experts with
like biases (i.e., biases in the same direction) never makes communication better than
just asking the less biased expert alone. It is therefore interesting to ask the following
question. Suppose that there exist both positive-biased and negative-biased experts.
Two experts are randomly drawn from the population. At the beginning of the game,
should the decision maker discover the biases of two experts, and then choose the
best way to consult them, or should he consult them directly without discovering
their biases? I now give an example to show that the latter option may be preferable.
28For example, the consumer advocate groups organized by trial lawyers.
26Let the distribution be (1
2, 1
2) on {b,−b} = {1
4,−1
4}. This bias value is chosen so
that no information is revealed when each expert is consulted alone and their biases
are common knowledge. If the decision maker discovers the biases of the two experts
at the beginning, then according to the results of KM, his optimal decision is as
follows.
1. Consult neither of them if the biases of the two experts are the same, since no
information is revealed if he consults them;
2. Consult both of them if their biases are opposite to each other, in which case
information is fully revealed when s ∈ [0, 1
2].29
Each case happens with probability 1
2. When no information about the state is
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If the decision maker chooses not to discover the experts’ biases and asks just one of
















which is strictly higher. The decision maker’s highest payoﬀ must be at least this
great if he has the option of asking them both. Thus, not knowing the experts’ biases
beneﬁts the decision maker. This example points to the possibility of the existence
of similar results to Theorem 3 for multiple-expert scenarios.
6.3 Communication or Delegation?
The insight provided by this model is of more signiﬁcant importance when com-
munication is the only enforceable mechanism. For example, I do not consider the
possibility of monetary transfers. de Garidel-Thoron and Ottaviani (2000) show that
there exist full revelation equilibria when such transfers are allowed. In addition, del-
egation of authority is not considered here. Dessein (2002) shows that barring money
29Without loss of generality, let the decision maker consult the negative-biased expert ﬁrst.
27transfers, when biases are common knowledge, delegation always gives the decision
maker higher utility than communication, as long as communication could be infor-
mative. However, this paper illustrates that when there is uncertainty about biases,
this result need not hold. In particular, full delegation gives the decision maker a
payoﬀ of −b2 for sure. On the other hand, when p = 1
2, the most informative commu-
nication equilibrium gives the decision maker a payoﬀ of −b2 + 4
3b3, which is always
higher. Thus for any b ∈ (0, 1
2), if p is close to 1
2, the decision maker is better oﬀ
with communication than with delegation. Therefore, although this paper is mainly
concerned with scenarios in which delegation is infeasible, it also provides a reason
why communication may be preferable to delegation.
In fact, a problem identiﬁed by CS is also alleviated. CS argue that if possible,
under common knowledge of biases, the expert would prefer to commit to telling the
truth. Without commitment, her expected payoﬀ through communication with the
decision maker is equal to V D − b2; with commitment to truth-telling, her expected
payoﬀ is the same as the decision maker’s payoﬀ when the decision maker fully del-
egates decisions to the expert, that is, −b2. Clearly, the latter is always higher than
the former since V D < 0 as long as b 6= 0. However, when biases are uncertain, in the
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both when her bias is b and when her bias is −b. Therefore, considering only b ∈ (0, 1
2),
the expert prefers to commit to truth-telling if and only if b ≥ 3
8. This result is also
robust to small changes in p around 1
2, although b may need to be smaller. Hence,
when the bias is small, and when the bias distribution is balanced, the expert may
prefer not to commit to telling the truth. This alleviates the problem that the expert’s
bias seems to be self-defeating in cheap talk models.
6.4 Generalizations and Further Research
This paper uses a stylized setup in which the state space is a bounded interval, utility
functions are of the quadratic loss form, and there are only two possible bias values
that are exact opposites of each other. There are various directions in which one may
want to generalize the result.
This result is readily generalizable to cases where the state space is also discrete.
The discussion following Theorem 3 illustrates intuitively how this can be done.
One may also want to allow other distributions of bias values. For example, one
may want to allow the expert to have no bias, to have a positive or negative bias of
28diﬀerent magnitudes, to have a bias that is always positive or negative, or to have a
bias drawn from a continuum of possible values. The most informative equilibrium
with complete information is known. Therefore, to prove that “nondisclosure is better
than disclosure” is true, it is suﬃcient to identify an equilibrium that dominates that
equilibrium. However, to prove that the statement is not true, it is necessary to
ﬁnd the most informative equilibrium under nondisclosure. The last remains an open
question and is one that I am exploring. I do not know of an example in which the
result is not true. However, my conjecture is that a slight variation to the setup
(for example, allowing the positive bias to be of slightly diﬀerent magnitude from the
negative bias) does not alter “the nondisclosure dominates disclosure” result, because
there is a welfare gap between nondisclosure and disclosure in the current setup, as
long as there is any uncertainty.30
This paper compares welfare under full disclosure and that under no disclosure.
It is also interesting to look at imperfect disclosure technologies.31 For example, a
technology that reveals the expert’s bias correctly with some probability and wrongly
the rest of the time. To see whether such imperfect technologies improve or worsen
welfare, it is necessary so study the second order properties of the decision maker’s
utility as a function of p, the probability that the expert’s bias is positive.
30I have been able to construct an equilibrium similar to that in Lemma 4 when negative bias and
positive bias are diﬀerent in magnitude but the expected bias remains zero and the bias values satisfy
certain restrictions, namely, they are not too large and not too diﬀerent in size. Furthermore, the
equilibrium converges to that in Lemma 4 when the positive and negative biases approach each other
in absolute value. Clearly when the parameter values are close to those in Lemma 4, nondisclosure
dominates disclosure.
31A particular form of imperfect technology would not aﬀect the result. It is clear that if the
technology either discloses the expert’s bias for sure or discloses nothing at all, then using this
technology would make the decision maker and the expert worse oﬀ.
29Appendix: Proofs
Proof. (of Lemma 4, Page 13) Given that y(m) = m, it is easy to see that µβ(s) = s+β
is optimal for s ∈ [b − β,1 − b − β], since s + β is her most preferred action. Note
also this interval is neither empty nor degenerate since b < 1
2 and β ∈ {−b,b}. This
ensures that the proﬁle constitutes an informative equilibrium. On the other hand,
µb(s) = 1 − b for s ∈ [1 − 2b,1] is optimal since in these states an expert with bias
b prefers 1 − b to all y ∈ [b,1 − b) by Lemma 1. Similarly µ−b(s) = b is optimal for
s ∈ [0,2b].
Now I check the optimality of the decision maker’s strategy. Given the expert’s







2 = b if m = b;
1
2(m + b) + 1
2(m − b) = m if m ∈ (b,1 − b);
1−2b+1
2 = 1 − b if m = 1 − b.
Therefore, the decision maker’s strategy y(m) = m for m ∈ [b,1 − b] is optimal.
Since other messages are never sent in equilibrium, he can have any belief about the
underlying state. In particular, his belief can be such that s = s0 ∈ [b,1 − b] with
probability one. Thus his optimal action when facing any other message would be
y(m) = s0.
Proof. (of Lemma 6, Page 16) Suppose to the contrary, there exist an inﬁnite number
of possible actions taken in equilibrium. Then by the Weierstrass-Bolzano Theorem,
there exists a monotonic convergent sequence of actions {yk} with limit y.
I claim y < b or y > 1 − b is impossible. Suppose y < b, then there exists K, such
that yk < b for all k ≥ K. Then in any state s, an expert of bias b strictly prefers
yK to each action yk if k > K. So messages that correspond to actions {yk}k>K can
only be sent by an expert of bias −b. This contradicts Lemma 5. The argument is
similar for y > 1 − b.
Now consider y ∈ [b,1 − b]. Note the message that corresponds to yk can only
be sent in two scenarios: (1) the expert has bias b, and s is between
yk+yk−1
2 − b and
yk+yk+1





look at the case in which yk is the only action induced in these intervals. A justiﬁcation
is provided in the following paragraph. As k → ∞, both intervals collapse. Thus
yk −[p(yk −b)+(1−p)(yk +b)] should converge to zero. But in fact the expression is
identical to the constant (1−2p)b, which is negative since p ∈ (1
2,1], a contradiction.
The Lemma is proved.
30Now I argue that it is without loss of generality that I focus my attention on
the following case: in the two intervals discussed above, yk is assumed to be the only
action the expert wants to induce. Suppose not. Then there exists another action y0
which is also induced in the interval between
yk+yk−1
2 − b and
yk+yk+1
2 − b when the
expert has bias b, which means y0 ∈ (yk,yk+1). This action is also most preferred
by an expert of bias −b for some values of s in the interval between
yk+yk−1
2 + b and
yk+yk+1
2 + b. I could just add this action y0 to the original sequence {yk}. I may do
this as long as there are at most countably many of these y0. Call this set Y 0. If Y 0 is
uncountable, then there exist z ∈ Y 0 such that for any ε > 0, there exist at least two
other actions: z0 ∈ (z−ε,z) and z00 ∈ (z,z+ε).32 Thus for any s < z−b, there exists
z0 that is strictly preferred to z by an expert of bias b; and for any s > z − b, there
exists z00 that is strictly preferred to z by an expert of bias b. A similar argument
applies to an expert of bias −b. Thus the message corresponding to z can only be
sent when the state is z − b and the expert has bias b, or when the state is z + b
and the expert has bias −b. This again causes a contradiction similar to that in the
previous paragraph. This argument works as long as Y 0 is uncountable. So Y 0 being
uncountable is impossible.
Proof. (of Theorem 1, Page 17) The argument preceding the theorem has shown that
the only possible equilibria are partitional. Now I characterize the equilibrium.




i ] for bias β. Let π(mi) be
the decision maker’s Bayesian belief about the probability that the expert has bias b,













Substituting the deﬁnition of a
β
i into the above expression, I obtain
π(m1) =
p(a1 − b)
a1 + (1 − 2p)b
,
π(mi) = p for i = 2,...,n − 1,
π(mn) =
p(1 − (an−1 − b))
(1 − an−1) − (1 − 2p)b
.
Thus the partition equilibria of size n can be described by the following diﬀerence
equation:












for i = 1,...,n.
32Suppose not. Then we have uncountable non-overlapping intervals summing up to ﬁnite length,
which is impossible.
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(1 − 2p)(1 − an−1) − b





which is exactly (3). In the above diﬀerence equation,
δ(a,p,b) ≡
a2 − b2
a + (1 − 2p)b
≡ a − b ·
(1 − 2p)a + b
a + (1 − 2p)b
.
For notational convenience, I suppress the dependence of δ on p and b when there is
no confusion.
Interpretation of the Function δ. The expression 1
2δ(a1,p,b) can be inter-
preted as the downward adjustment needed to calculate y1 given a1. This adjustment
is equal to α1/2 for the CS case with known bias b.33 In my model, this eﬀect is still
present. However, an additional second eﬀect also exists. The expert sends message
m1 more often when her bias is −b (s ∈ [0,a1+b]) than if her bias is b (s ∈ [0,a1−b]).
Thus the adjustment must take the expected amount of misrepresentation into ac-
count. In the deﬁnition of δ, the ﬁrst term, a, accounts for the ﬁrst eﬀect. The second
term, −b ·
(1−2p)a+b
a+(1−2p)b, accounts for the second eﬀect.
As a1 goes up, the ﬁrst term becomes larger. The reason is simple. As the upper
bound gets larger, to calculate the expectation of a uniformly distributed random
variable, one needs to subtract more from the upper bound. As a1 goes up, the
second term also increases. An increase in a1 makes message m1 relatively more
likely to come from the expert when she is of positive bias b. Thus the downward
adjustment needs to be larger. So δ is increasing in a1.
As p goes up, the ﬁrst eﬀect is unchanged. However, the second term becomes
larger, since an increase in p means the message m1 is more likely to be sent by an
expert with positive bias b. This increases the downward adjustment needed. So δ is
increasing in b.
The eﬀect of a change in b is ambiguous. Note that b does not appear in the
ﬁrst term. But an increase in b aﬀects the second term in two ways. First, the
absolute value of the adjustment associated with the second term increases. Second,
33This simply reﬂects the fact that to calculate the expected value of s given that s is uniformly
distributed on [0,α1], one must subtract α1/2 from α1, the upper bound. Note that αi in the CS
model corresponds to ab
i = ai − b in my model with uncertain biases.
32the increase in b makes the message less likely to come from the expert when she
has positive bias (a1 − b is smaller relative to a1 + b). Thus the magnitude of the
downward adjustment should decrease. If the second term is negative, then the two
eﬀects operate in the same direction, and an increase in b results a decrease in δ.
Otherwise, the opposite could be true.
The following fact summarizes information about the derivatives of δ with respect
to a, p, and b:
Fact 1. The derivatives of function δ satisfy:
(i) δa(·) =
a2+2(1−2p)ab+b2
(a+(1−2p)b)2 = 1 +
(1−(1−2p)2)b2









2δ(an−1 −1,p,b) is the upward adjustment needed to calculate
yn from an−1 . The Fact above about derivatives of δ can similarly be used to provide
an intuitive explanation for this expression.
Adding up adjacent equations in (3) and rearranging give
a2 − a1 = δ(a1,p,b) − 2b(1 − 2p)
ai − ai−1 = ai−1 − ai−2 − 4b(1 − 2p) i = 3,...,n − 1,
−δ(an−1 − 1,p,b) + 2b(1 − 2p) = an−1 − an−2
This is exactly Equation (5). The above diﬀerence equation can also be written in its
backward form:
an−2 − an−1 = δ(an−1 − 1,p,b) − 2b(1 − 2p)
an−i − an−(i−1) = an−(i−1) − an−(i−2) − 4b(1 − 2p) i = 3,...,n − 1,
−δ(a1,p,b) + 2b(1 − 2p) = a1 − a2
It is useful to look at partial solutions of (5); that is, boundary points that
satisfy some equations in (5), but not the rest. The following Lemma considers
boundary points that are deﬁned by all equations except the last equation in (5) (and
its backward version). It describes how they depend on the initial value a1 (or for
the backward version, an−1) and p.
Lemma 10. In (5), consider all equations except the last one. Then ai − ai−1 is
strictly increasing in a1 ≥ b and p for i = 2,...,n − 1. Hence ai is also strictly
increasing in a1 and p. Similarly, in the backward version of (5), considering all
33equations but the last, an−i − an−(i−1) is strictly increasing in an−1 ≤ 1 − b and p for
i = 2,...,n − 1. Hence an−i is also strictly increasing in an−1 and p.
Proof. (of Lemma 10) Solving (5) forward, I get
ai − ai−1 = δ(a1,·) − 4b(i − 2)(1 − 2p) − 2b(1 − 2p),
for i = 2,...,n−1. By Fact 1, δa > 0, and if a1 ≥ b, then δp ≥ 0. It then immediately
follows that ai − ai−1 is strictly increasing in a1 and p for i = 2,...,n − 1. Since
ai = a1+
P
j=2 (aj − aj−1), ai is also strictly increasing in a1 and p for i = 2,...,n−1.
The corresponding statements for the backward version can be similarly shown.
Equation (5) implies
ai − a1 = (i − 1)δ(a1,·) − 2b(i − 1)
2(1 − 2p). (7)
The backward version of (5) gives
an−i − an−1 = (i − 1)δ(an−1 − 1,·) − 2b(i − 1)
2(1 − 2p). (8)
Adding (7) and (8) at i = n − 1, I have
δ(a1,·) + δ(an−1 − 1,·) − 4b(n − 2)(1 − 2p) = 0. (9)
Deﬁne function λ as
λ(a,p,b,i) ≡ a + (i − 1)δ(a,p,b) − 2b(i − 1)
2(1 − 2p).
For notational convenience, I suppress the dependence of λ on p and b when there is
no confusion.
Interpretation of λ. Given any initial value of a1, λ(a1,i) gives the value of
ai according to (5) by solving it forward. On the other hand, λ(an−1 − 1,i) gives the
value of an−i according to the backward version of (5), given an initial value of an−1.
Observe the following facts about the derivatives of λ:
Fact 2. The derivatives of function λ satisfy:
(i) λa(·) = 1 + (i − 1)δa(·) > 0.
(ii) λp(·) = (i − 1)δp(·) + 4b(i − 1)2, which is greater than or equal to 0 if |a| ≥ b.
(iii) λb(·) = (i − 1)δb(·) − 2(i − 1)2(1 − 2p).
(iv) λi(·) = δ(a,·) − 4b(i − 1)(1 − 2p), and is nonnegative if δ(a,·) ≥ 0 and p ∈ [1
2,1].
34The interpretation for the positive sign of the derivative of λ with respect to a is
that all boundary points increase as the initial point increases. This is true for both
forward and backward versions of (5).
Now using the deﬁnition of λ(·) in (9), I get
δ(a1,·) + δ(λ(a1,n − 1) − 1,·) − 4b(n − 2)(1 − 2p) = 0. (10)
Similarly, using the deﬁnition of λ(·) in the backward version of (9) yields
δ(λ(an−1 − 1,n − 1),·) + δ(an−1 − 1,·) − 4b(n − 2)(1 − 2p) = 0. (11)
The solution to Equation (10) in [b,1−b] is unique if it exists, because the left hand
side is strictly increasing in a1 by Facts 1 and 2.
Now I need to show that a unique partitional equilibrium exists for each n ≤
N(p,b). I ﬁrst establish a useful lemma.
Lemma 11. Fix b > 0, p ∈ [1
2,1], and n ≥ 2. For any a1 ≥ b, if an−1 satisﬁes (9),
then an−1 ≤ 1 − a1. Furthermore, an−1 < 1 − b always holds in equilibrium.
Proof. First note that the left hand side of (9) is strictly increasing in an−1 since
δa(·) > 0 by Fact 1. So to prove an−1 ≤ 1−a1, it suﬃces to show that if an−1 = 1−a1,
then the left hand side is nonnegative.
For p ∈ [1
2,1], substituting an−1 = 1 − a1 into (9) yields
L.H.S. of (9) =
2b(1 − 2p)(a2
1 − b2)
(1 − 2p)2b2 − a2
1
− 4b(n − 2)(1 − 2p).
Both terms are nonnegative since a1 ≥ b and p ∈ [1
2,1].34 Thus an−1 ≤ 1 − a1. The
ﬁrst part is proved.
If n = 2, the above expression is equal to 0 if a1 = b. This means that a1 = b and
a2−1 = 1 − a1 = 1 − b solve (9). However, this implies a1 = 1
2, contradicting b < 1
2.
Thus a1 > b, hence an−1 ≤ 1 − a1 < 1 − b.
If n ≥ 3, then the above expression is positive unless p = 1
2. Thus when p ∈ (1
2,1],
an−1 < 1 − a1 ≤ 1 − b. When p = 1
2, then a1 > b since otherwise ai − ai−1 = 0 for
all i, as δ(a1,p,b) = 0 at a1 = b. So an−1 ≤ 1 − a1 < 1 − b. Thus the second part is
proved.
34If p = 1, then the ﬁrst term is equal to 2b no matter what a1 is. In particular, when a1 = b both
the denominator and the numerator are zero, but “cancelling out” a2
1 − b2 (by taking limits) gives
2b. On the other hand, if p = 1
2, then both terms are zero.
35By Lemma 11, a partitional equilibrium of size n exists if and only if there exists
a1 ≥ b to satisfy Equation (10). We need a1 ≥ b in order for ab
1 = a1 − b ≥ 0.
Claim. There exists a1 ≥ b satisfying (10) if and only if the left hand side of (10)
is nonpositive at a1 = b.
Proof of Claim. Note (10) is obtained by replacing an−1 with
λ(a1,n − 1) = a1 + (n − 2)δ(a1) − 2b(n − 2)
2(1 − 2p)
in (9). As shown in the proof of Lemma 11, the left hand side of (9) is nonnegative for
an−1 ≥ 1−a1. Note when a1 = 1
2, λ(a1,n−1) ≥ a1 = 1−a1. Thus the left hand side
of (10) is nonnegative when a1 = 1
2. The left hand side of (10) is a continuous and
strictly increasing function of a1. Continuity and the Intermediate Value Theorem
implies there exists a1 ∈ [b, 1
2] solving (10) if the left hand side of (10) is nonpositive
at a1 = b. On the other hand, if the left hand side of (10) is positive at a1 = b, then
monotonicity implies that there does not exist a1 ∈ [b, 1
2] solving (10). Thus the claim
is proved.
The following facts are useful:
δ(a,p,b) = a + b for p = 1;
δ(a,p,b) = 0 for p ∈ [1
2,1),a = b;
λ(a,p,b,i) = b for p = 1
2,a = b.
Before proceeding, note that the left hand side of (10) is nondecreasing in n, since
the derivative is
δa(λ(a1,n − 1) − 1,·)λi(a1,n − 1) − 4b(1 − 2p) ≥ 0.
By Facts 1 and 2 and p ∈ [1
2,1], the above expression is nonnegative, and strictly
positive unless a1 = b and p = 1
2. Now I substitute a1 = b into (10) and obtain for
p ∈ [1
2,1),
(b − 2b(n − 2)2(1 − 2p) − 1)2 − b2
b − 2b(n − 2)2(1 − 2p) − 1 + b(1 − 2p)
− 4b(n − 2)(1 − 2p) ≤ 0.
Additionally, I need to guarantee that
b − 2b(n − 2)
2(1 − 2p) < 1 − b,
by the second part of Lemma 11. For p = 1
2, the two equations become
−2b + 1
b − 1




b < 1 − b,
which are satisﬁed by our assumption b ∈ (0, 1
2). These conditions do not depend on
n. So there exists a partitional equilibrium for each n ∈ N if p = 1
2.
For p = 1, the condition is (a1+b)+(λ(a1,n−1)−1+b)−4b(n−2)(1−2)|a1=b ≤ 0,
which simpliﬁes into
2n(n − 1)b ≤ 1.
Since the left hand side of (10) is nondecreasing in n, when p ∈ (1
2,1], the set of
numbers that satisfy (4) is the set of integers that are smaller than the largest integer
that satisﬁes (4). Furthermore since the derivative of the left hand side of (10) with
respect to a1 is
δa(a1,·) + δa(an−1 − 1,·)λa(a1,·),
which is strictly positive for any a1 > b by Facts 1 and 2, the a1 satisfying (10)
is unique. Therefore the partitional equilibrium of size n is also unique for each
n = 1,..,N(p,b).
Proof. (of Corollary 1.1, Page 19) First I establish that in equilibrium, a1 is strictly
decreasing in p when p ∈ (1
2,1). Applying the Implicit Function Theorem to equa-




δp(a1,·) + δa(an−1 − 1,·)λp(a1,·) + δp(an−1 − 1,·) + 8b(n − 2)
δa(a1,·) + δa(an−1 − 1,·)λa(a1,·)
.
By Facts 1 and 2 about the values of the derivatives of δ and λ, every term in the
denominator and the numerator is nonnegative. The term
δp(an−1 − 1,·)
is strictly positive due to an−1 < 1 − b by Lemma 11, and due to Part (ii) of Fact 1.
Thus I conclude that
∂a1
∂p < 0 for all p ∈ [1
2,1].
Now I show that
∂ai
∂p < 0 for i = 2,...,n − 1 by induction. Let 1 ≥ p > p0 ≥ 1
2.
Let j be the smallest i such that ai(p) ≥ ai(p0). Then j ≥ 2 since it has been shown
that a1 is strictly decreasing in p. Now using (5), I have
aj+1(p) − aj(p) = aj(p) − aj−1(p) − 4b(1 − 2p) > aj(p) − aj−1(p) − 4b(1 − 2p0)
> aj(p0) − aj−1(p0) − 4b(1 − 2p0) = aj+1(p0) − aj(p0).
37The equality signs come directly from (5). The ﬁrst inequality uses the fact that
−4b(1 − 2p) > −4b(1 − 2p0). The second inequality sign is implied by aj(p) ≥ aj(p0)
and aj−1(p) < aj−1(p0). With similar arguments, and by induction,
ai(p) − ai−1(p) > ai(p
0) − ai−1(p
0)
for all i = j + 1,...,n − 1. In particular,
an−1(p) − an−2(p) > an−1(p
0) − an−2(p
0).
Summing across i, I have
an−1(p) − aj(p) > an−1(p
0) − aj(p
0).
This implies an−1(p) ≥ an−1(p0) since aj(p) ≥ aj(p0). Thus I have
−δ(an−1(p) − 1,p,b) + 2b(1 − 2p) < −δ(an−1(p
0) − 1,p
0,b) + 2b(1 − 2p
0),
since δa > 0, δp > 0 and 2b(1 − 2p) < 2b(1 − 2p0). By (5),
−δ(an−1 − 1,p,b) + 2b(1 − 2p) = an−1 − an−2
must hold in equilibrium.
The last three equations cause a contradiction.35 Hence ai is strictly decreasing
in p in equilibrium.
Proof. (of Corollary 1.2, Page 19) Let ˜ N(p,b) be the number that satisﬁes
b − 2b(n − 2)
2(1 − 2p) < 1 − b
and satisﬁes (4) with equality. I know it is unique from the proof of Theorem 1. It
suﬃces to show that ˜ N is nonincreasing in p and b, since N(p,b) is the largest integer
smaller than or equal to ˜ N(p,b).
The left hand side of (10) is nondecreasing in n. The derivative is
δa(λ(a1) − 1,·)λn(·) − 4b(1 − 2p) ≥ 0,







35Note that the same proof tactic is used in the proof of Lemma 12 on Page 42.
38Part 1. ˜ N is nonincreasing in p.
Note the derivative of the left hand side of (10) with respect to p is
δp(a1,·) + δa(an−1 − 1,·)λa(a1,·) + δp(an−1 − 1,·) + 8b(n − 2),
which by Facts 1 and 2 is strictly positive for any a1 ≥ b and an−1 = λ(a1,·) ≤ 1−b.








The expression is negative since the denominator is nonnegative and the numerator
is positive. Now I look at p = 1. Note in (4) as p → 1, the inequality approaches
2(n − 1)
2b ≤ 1.
In contrast, N(1,b) is the largest integer that satisﬁes
2n(n − 1)b ≤ 1.
Therefore, limp→1 N(p,b) ≥ N(1,b). In fact, the largest diﬀerence between the two
values is one, since limp→1 ˜ N(p,b) − ˜ N(1,b) =
q
1







To summarize, N(p,b) is nonincreasing in p for all p ∈ [1
2,1] and b ∈ (0, 1
2).
Part 2. ˜ N is nonincreasing in b.
That ˜ N(1,b) is nonincreasing in b can be easily observed from the condition
2n(n − 1)b ≤ 1.
Now consider the case p 6= 1. Note that (4) is obtained by substituting a1 = b
into (10). Also observe the facts δ(a1,p,b) = 0 and λ(a1,p,b,n−1) = 0+b−2b(n−
2)2(1 − 2p) at a1 = b. Deﬁne




0(b) = 1 − 2b(n − 2)
2(1 − 2p),
which is nonnegative for all n ≥ 2. Also, l(b) = l0(b)b since l(b) is linear in b.
First, it is clear that l(b) ≤ 1 − b is required since l(b) = λ(b,p,b,n − 1) is the
value of an−1 when a1 = b. This requires that
2b − 2b(n − 2)
2(1 − 2p) ≤ 1,
39which is more likely to be satisﬁed by smaller b for any n ≥ 2.
Second, (4) can be written as
(l(b) − 1)2 − b2
l(b) − 1 + b(1 − 2p)









In the derivation, I have used l(b) = l0(b)b. Each term in the numerator of the last
expression is nonnegative, and some terms are strictly positive (for example, b). Thus
∂(L.H.S. of (4))/∂b > 0.







Proof. (of Lemma 7, Page 20) First note that yi is the action that maximizes the
decision maker’s expected utility given that mi is received, and hence must satisfy
the relevant ﬁrst order conditions. Thus although yi depends on p, I may use the
Envelope Theorem and ignore such dependence when taking derivatives of V D with












∂p + (1 − p)[(a
−b


















(s − yi)2ds. (12)
I evaluate the two terms on the right hand side separately. Denote the ﬁrst term by
A1 and the second term A2.
First I calculate A1. By the deﬁnitions of a
β















(2p − 1)[(ai − b − yi)





40Note (ai − b − yi) + (ai − b − yi+1) = −2b < 0 and yi < ai < yi+1. Therefore
|ai − b − yi| < |ai − b − yi+1|. Since p ≥ 1
2 and
∂ai
∂p < 0 by Corollary 1.1, A1 ≥ 0 with
equality sign only at p = 1
2.
Now I consider A2. It is useful to consider the ﬁrst and the last terms of the
summation (i = 1 and i = n) separately from the others. I have
R a1−b
0 (s − y1)2ds −
R a1+b
0 (s − y1)2ds +
R 1




3[(a1 − b − y1)3 − (a1 + b − y1)3 − (an−1 − b − yn)3 + (an−1 + b − yn)3]
= 1
3[−2 · 3(a1 − y1)2b + 2 · 3(an−1 − yn)2b]
= b
2(−δ(a1)2 + δ(an−1 − 1)2).




2 + δ(an−1 − 1)
2) = b
2 · 2(a1 − an−1) · 4b(1 − 2p) ≥ 0.
The inequality sign is because a1 ≤ an−1 and 1 − 2p ≤ 0. Thus the sum of the ﬁrst
and last summation terms in A2 is nonnegative. Note that it holds as equality only
if p = 1
2 or n = 2.
The other terms (i = 2,...,n − 1) in A2 can be calculated using (5):
R ai−b




3[(ai − b − yi)3 − (ai−1 − b − yi)3 + (ai + b − yi)3 − (ai−1 + b − yi)3]
= 1
3[2(ai − yi)3 + 2 · 3(ai − yi)b2 − 2(ai−1 − yi)3 − 2 · 3(ai−1 − yi)b2]
≥ 0.
The last inequality simply uses the fact ai ≥ ai−1. Thus A2 is nonnegative, and equals
zero only if p = 1




∂p ≤ 0 and is equal to zero only if p = 1
2.
Proof. (of Theorem 2, Page 20) The argument is simple. Lemma 7 states that for
the same partition size, the decision maker always strictly prefer the equilibrium
with smaller p. On the other hand, Corollary 1.2 implies that when p is smaller,
there is also a (weakly) larger set of partition sizes to choose from since N(p,b) is
nonincreasing in p. Thus the most informative equilibrium with smaller p ∈ [1
2,1]
always gives the decision maker strictly higher payoﬀs.
The following lemma compares boundary points of size-n and size-n+1 equilibria.
It is useful in the proof of Lemma 8.
41Lemma 12. If both size-n and size-n + 1 equilibria exist, then for i = 1,...,n − 1,
1. ai(n + 1) < ai(n) < ai+1(n + 1).
2. ai+1(n + 1) − ai(n + 1) < ai(n) − ai−1(n).
Proof. Part 1. I show ai(n + 1) < ai(n) by using the forward version of (5). The
proof is by induction.
First I show a1(n + 1) < a1(n). Suppose to the contrary, a1(n + 1) ≥ a1(n).
From (5), I get
ai − ai−1 = δ(a1,p,b) − 2b(1 − 2p) − 4b(i − 2)(1 − 2p).
By Fact 1, δa > 0. Thus if a1(n + 1) ≥ a1(n), I have
ai(n + 1) − ai−1(n + 1) ≥ ai(n) − ai−1(n),
which implies that
ai(n + 1) ≥ ai(n)
for i = 1,...,n−1. Since an(n+1)−an−1(n+1) = an−1(n+1)−an−2(n+1)−4b(1−2p) ≥
an−1(n + 1) − an−2(n + 1), I have
an(n + 1) − an−1(n + 1) ≥ an−1(n) − an−2(n). (13)
Observe that whenever a1 > b or p 6= 1
2, δ(a1) − 2b(1 − 2p) must be strictly positive.
But for ﬁnite n, a1 = b and p = 1
2 cannot both be true. So
an(n + 1) − an−1(n + 1) = δ(a1(n + 1)) − 2b(1 − 2p) − 4b(n + 1 − 2)(1 − 2p) > 0.
Thus an(n + 1) > an−1(n + 1) ≥ an−1(n). Fact 1 says δa > 0. Therefore
−δ(an(n + 1) − 1,·) + 2b(1 − 2p) < −δ(an−1(n) − 1,·) + 2b(1 − 2p). (14)
Now since {ai(n)} and {ai(n + 1)} are equilibrium boundary points, they must satisfy
the following conditions:
−δ(an−1(n) − 1,·) + 2b(1 − 2p) = an−1(n) − an−2(n), (15)
−δ(an(n + 1) − 1,·) + 2b(1 − 2p) = an(n + 1) − an−1(n + 1). (16)
These contradict (13) and (14).
Now I perform the second step of the induction. Assume aj(n + 1) < aj(n) for
j = 1,...,i − 1. I want to show that ai(n + 1) < ai(n).
42Suppose to the contrary, ai(n + 1) ≥ ai(n). This implies that
ai(n + 1) − ai−1(n + 1) > ai(n) − ai−1(n)
by the induction hypothesis. By (5),
aj(n + 1) − aj−1(n + 1) > aj(n) − aj−1(n)
for j = i,...,n − 1. As in the ﬁrst step, I can derive (13) and (14), which again
contradict (15) and (16).
That ai(n) < ai+1(n + 1) can be similarly proved by using the backward version
of (5).
Part 2. That ai+1(n+1)−ai(n+1) < ai(n)−ai−1(n) is an immediate consequence
of Part 1. To see this, suppose ai+1(n+1)−ai(n+1) ≥ ai(n)−ai−1(n) instead. This
would imply an(n + 1) − an−1(n + 1) ≥ an−1(n) − an−2(n). But an(n + 1) > an−1(n).
This leads to a contradiction similar to that in the proof of Part 1.
Lemma 12 is thus proved.
Proof. (of Lemma 8, Page 21) Let V D
n and V D
n+1 be the decision maker’s expected
utility from the size-n and size-n + 1 equilibria, respectively. The goal is to show
V D
n < V D
n+1.
I show that the equilibrium with n+1 partition units can be deformed into a re-
ﬁnement of the equilibrium with n partition units. Let {ai(n)}
n
i=0 and {ai(n + 1)}
n+1
i=0
be the boundary points that respectively correspond to the size-n and size-n + 1
equilibria. Thus they must satisfy (5) for their respective sizes.
By Lemma 12, [an−1(n),an(n+1)] is not degenerate. Thus choose any ax
n(n+1) =





i=0 to the backward
version of (5) of size-n + 1. For notational convenience, I do not explicitly refer to
the size n+1 below. Of course ax
n+1 = 1 and ax
0 = 0. The solution is “partial” in the
sense that given the initial value ax
n, ax
n+1−i is determined according to the backward




















n = x = an(n + 1) due to the uniqueness of the size-n + 1 equilibrium.
I choose ax
1 to satisfy (17). First I show such ax
1 exists.




1) + 2b(1 − 2p) = ax
1 − ax
2.
Proof of Claim. Note that ax
n+1−i = λ(ax
n−1,i) for i = 1,...,n−1 by the deﬁnition
of λ. Since λa > 0 by Fact 2, for each x ∈ [an−1(n),an(n + 1)] and i = 1,...,n − 1, I
have ax
n+1−i ∈ [an−i(n),an+1−i(n + 1)] is increasing in x. The intervals are nonempty
by Lemma 12. In particular, ax
2 ∈ [a1(n),a2(n + 1)].
First I set ax
1 = ax
2. I have −δ(ax
1) < 0, since b ≤ a1(n + 1) < a1(n) ≤ ax
2. Note
a1(n+1) < a1(n) is implied by Lemma 12. So the L.H.S. of (17) is negative. But the
R.H.S. of (17) is 0. So




Now if I can show
L.H.S. of (17) ≥ R.H.S. of (17)
at ax
1 = b, then the desired statement follows from the Intermediate Value Theorem
since both sides of (17) are continuous in ax
1.
If I set ax
1 = b, then the L.H.S. of (17) is 2b(1−2p) ≤ 0 if p < 1, and −4b if p = 1.36
The R.H.S. of (17) is b−ax
2. Since ax
2 ≥ a1(n) it suﬃces to show 2b(1−2p) ≥ b−a1(n)
when p 6= 1, and −4b ≥ b − a1(n) for p = 1.
When p 6= 1, suppose to the contrary that a1(n) < b − 2b(1 − 2p). Then since
δa > 0, a2(n)−a1(n) = δ(a1(n)) < δ(b−2b(1−2p),·) = −4b(1−2p). The last equality
sign is obtained by substituting a = b − 2b(1 − 2p) into the deﬁnition of δ. On the
other hand, a3(n+1)−a2(n+1) = a2(n+1)−a1(n+1)−4b(1−2p) ≥ −4b(1−2p).
This violates Part 2 of Lemma 12.
When p = 1, suppose to the contrary that a1(n) < b + 4b. Then δ(a1(n)) =
a1 +b < 6b, and thus a2(n)−a1(n) = δ(a1(n)) < 6b. On the other hand, a3(n+1)−
a2(n+1) = a2(n+1)−a1(n+1)−4b(1−2p) = δ(a1(n+1))+4b = a1(n+1)+b+4b ≥ 6b.
This again violates Part 2 of Lemma 12.
The claim is thus proved.
By applying the Implicit Function Theorem, it is straightforward to show ax
1 is
strictly increasing in ax
2. Furthermore, since ax
2 is strictly increasing in x by Lemma 10
and all terms in (17) depend on x through ax
2, ax
1 is strictly increasing in x.
Let ˆ ax





3 − 4b(1 − 2p). Note that ax
1 = ˆ a
x
1




36Recall δ(a1,p,b) = a1 + b for p = 1.
44a1(n+1)−a2(n+1) and ˆ a
x
1 < a1(n+1) by Lemma 10. Since −δ(a1(n+1))+2b(1−2p) =
a1(n+1)−a2(n+1), Fact 1 implies that −δ(ˆ a
x




1 > ˆ a
x
1
for x ∈ [an−1(n),an(n + 1)).
Now let me interpret the partition {ax
i}
n+1
i=0 as the following strategy proﬁle:37




i ] for i =
1,...,n + 1, where a
x,β
0 = 0, a
x,β
n+1 = 1, and a
x,β
i = ax
i − β for i = 1,...,n.
2. When receiving the message mi, the decision maker forms Bayesian beliefs, and
chooses action yx
i that is equal to the expected value of s conditional on mi
being sent. That is, {yx
i } and {ax
i} satisfy the size-n + 1 version of 3.





i=0 is the same as {ai(n)}
n+1
i=0 when x = an(n+1). So V D(an(n+1)) =
V D
n+1. Second, when x = an−1(n), ax
2 = a1(n). Thus {ax
i}
n+1
i=0 is a reﬁnement of the
size-n equilibrium {ai(n)}
n
i=0 at x = an−1(n). So V D(an−1(n)) ≥ V D
n−1. Now to
prove V D
n+1 > V D
n , it suﬃces to show V D(x) is strictly increasing in x, which implies




























Applying the Envelope Theorem, I may ignore the indirect eﬀect x has on V D through
the {yx
i }, since the {yx





















































∂x . Furthermore, by Lemma 10,
∂ax
i
∂x > 0. Therefore,
to prove
dV D(x)
dx > 0, it suﬃces to show
p[(a
x





i − b − y
x
i+1)
2] + (1 − p)[(a
x









for all i = 1,...,n and strictly negative for some such i. The proof of this statement
is as follows.
37The strategy proﬁle does not have to be an equilibrium. The purpose is to calculate the decision
maker’s expected payoﬀ, and show how it depends on the initial value x.
45Note that (5) is satisﬁed by the {ai} if and only if the {yx
i } satisfy (3) and
ai =
yi+yi+1
2 . Observe that ax
i satisﬁes all equations of the backward size-n+1 version
of (5) but the last two, and that the {yx
i } are deﬁned so as to satisfy the size-n + 1





2 for i = 3,...,n.38 This implies
that for i = 3,...,n,
a
x


















i − b − y
x
i ) + (a
x
i − b − y
x
i+1) = −2b.
The last equality then implies |ax




i − b − yx
i+1

. Thus for i = 3,...,n,
p[(ax
i − b − yx
i )2 − (ax
i − b − yx
i+1)2] + (1 − p)[(ax
i + b − yx
i )2 − (ax
i + b − yx
i+1)2]
= (2p − 1)[(ax
i − b − yx
i )2 − (ax
i − b − yx
i+1)2]
≤ 0.











2 + b(1 − 2p). Note that yx





2 < 0. Since ˆ ax
1 satisﬁes the second






























2 − b − y
x
3) = −2b.
Similarly to the above, |ax
i − b − yx
i | <
 ax
i − b − yx
i+1




2 − ˆ yx
2), and get
p[(ax
2 − b − yx
2)2 − (ax
2 − b − yx
3)2] + (1 − p)[(ax
2 + b − yx
2)2 − (ax
2 + b − y3)2]
= (2p − 1)[(ax
2 − b − ˆ y2)2 − (ax
2 − b − y3)2] + [2(ax
2 − ˆ yx
2 + b(1 − 2p))(ˆ yx
2 − yx
2) + (ˆ yx
2 − yx
2)2]
The ﬁrst term in the last expression is nonpositive by arguments similar to those





2 + b(1 − 2p), I have ax
2 − ˆ yx




2 > 0. On the other hand,










2 by the relationship ax
2 > ax
1 > ˆ ax
1. So 2(ax
2 − ˆ yx
2 + b(1 −
2p))(ˆ yx
2 − yx
2) + (ˆ yx
2 − yx
2)2 < 0. I then have
p[(a
x





2 − b − y
x
3)
2] + (1 − p)[(a
x





2 + b − y3)
2] < 0.
38The details of the argument are available from the author.
46Since ax






as in the i = 3,...,n case,
p[(a
x





1 − b − y
x
2)
2] + (1 − p)[(a
x









Summarizing the argument above,
p[(a
x





i − b − y
x
i+1)
2] + (1 − p)[(a
x









for all i = 1,...,n and strictly negative for i = 2.
Thus I conclude
dV D(x)
dx > 0. Hence V D
n+1 > V D(an−1(n)) ≥ V D
n .
Proof. (of Lemma 9) As in the proof of Lemma 7, I may use the Envelope Theorem






























Using the deﬁnition a
β
i = ai − β for i = 1,...,n, and the fact that ai =
yi+yi+1

















I know from the proof of Lemma 7 that [(ab
i − yi)2 − (ab
i − yi+1)2] < 0 for i = 1,...,n.
Now I show that (2p − 1)
∂ai
∂b − 1 < 0. This implies that ∂V D
∂b < 0.
Let αi ≡ pab
i − (1 − p)a
−b
i .39 Note that αi = (2p − 1)ai − b for i = 1,...,n − 1.
The task is thus to show
∂αi
∂b < 0 for i = 1,...,n − 1. I may rewrite (5) as
α2 − α1 = α1 + b + b ·
α1
α1 + 4p(1 − p)b
+ 2b(1 − 2p)
2
αi − αi−1 = αi−1 − αi−2 + 4b(1 − 2p)
2 i = 3,...,n − 1, (19)
αn−1 − αn−2 = −[αn−1 − (2p − 1) + b + b ·
αn−1 − (2p − 1)
αn−1 + 4p(1 − p)b − (2p − 1)
+ 2b(1 − 2p)
2].
Considering all equations but the last, I may establish a result similar to Lemma 10.
That is
1. αi − αi−1 is strictly increasing in α1 and b for all α1 ≥ (2p − 1)b − b and
i = 2,...,n − 1.
2. αi is also strictly increasing in α1 and b for i = 2,...,n − 1.
39The symbol αi since it has the CS model as the special case when p = 1, as in Section 3.
47The proof is similar to that of Lemma 10 and is omitted here.
Now consider the last equation of (19). The L.H.S. is increasing in a1 and b. The







[an−1 + 4p(1 − p)b − (2p − 1)]2 ≥ 0.
Hence the R.H.S. is strictly decreasing in a1 since an−1 is strictly increasing in a1
and an−1 is the only channel through which the R.H.S. depends on a1. The R.H.S. is






[an−1 − (2p − 1)]2 + 4p(1 − p)b2 ∂an−1
∂b
[an−1 + 4p(1 − p)b − (2p − 1)]2
and
∂an−1
∂b > 0. The Implicit Function Theorem thus implies that in equilibrium, a1
decreases as b increases. That ai (i = 2,...,n − 1) is strictly decreasing in b can be
shown by induction, as in the proof of Corollary 1.1.
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